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ABSTRACT
We detail our ongoing work in Flint, Michigan to detect pipes made
of lead and other hazardous metals. After elevated levels of lead
were detected in residents’ drinking water, followed by an increase
in blood lead levels in area children, the state and federal govern-
ments directed over $125 million to replace water service lines, the
pipes connecting each home to the water system. In the absence of
accurate records, and with the high cost of determining buried pipe
materials, we put forth a number of predictive and procedural tools
to aid in the search and removal of lead infrastructure. Alongside
these statistical and machine learning approaches, we describe our
interactions with government officials in recommending homes
for both inspection and replacement, with a focus on the statisti-
cal model that adapts to incoming information. Finally, in light of
discussions about increased spending on infrastructure develop-
ment by the federal government, we explore how our approach
generalizes beyond Flint to other municipalities nationwide.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems→Data analytics; •Machine learning
→ Applied computing;
KEYWORDS
Water Infrastructure; Flint Water Crisis; Risk Assessment; Machine
Learning; Active Learning; Public Policy
ACM Reference Format:
Jacob Abernethy, Alex Chojnacki, Arya Farahi, Eric Schwartz, and Jared
Webb. 2018. ActiveRemediation: The Search for Lead Pipes in Flint, Michigan.
In KDD ’18: The 24th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge
Discovery & Data Mining, August 19–23, 2018, London, United Kingdom.ACM,
New York, NY, USA, Article 4, 10 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3219819.
3219896
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM
must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish,
to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a
fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
KDD ’18, August 19–23, 2018, London, United Kingdom
© 2018 Association for Computing Machinery.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-5552-0/18/08. . . $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/3219819.3219896
1 INTRODUCTION
The story of the Flint Water Crisis is long and has many facets,
involving government failures, public health challenges, and social
and economic justice. As Flint struggled financially after the 2008
housing crisis, the state of Michigan installed emergency managers
to implement several cost saving measures. One of these actions
was to switch Flint’s drinking water source from the Detroit system
to the local Flint river in April 2014. The new water had different
chemical characteristics which were overlooked by water officials.
Of course many water systems have lead pipes, but these pipes are
typically coated with layers of deposits, and the water is treated ap-
propriately in order to prevent corrosion and the leaching of heavy
metals. City officials failed to follow such necessary procedures, the
pipes began to corrode, Flint’s drinking water started to give off
a different color and smell [11], and Flint residents were exposed
to elevated levels of lead for nearly two years before the problems
received proper attention. In August 2015 environmental engineers
raised alarm bells about contaminated water1 [21], not long after a
pediatrician observed a jump in the number of Flint children with
high blood lead levels2[14], and by January 2016 the Flint Water
Crisis was international news.
As attention to the problem was growing, government officials
at all levels got involved in managing the damage and pushing
recovery efforts. In looking for the primary source of lead in Flint’s
water distribution, attention turned to Flint’s water service lines, the
pipes that connect homes to the city water system. These service
lines are hypothesized to be the prime contributor to lead water
contamination across the United States [20]. Service lines, therefore,
became a top priority for the City of Flint in February 2016. The
Michigan state legislature eventually appropriated $27M towards
the expensive process of replacing these lines at large scale; later the
U.S. Congress allocated another nearly $100M towards the recovery
effort. The group directed to execute the replacement program was
called Flint Fast Action and Sustainability program (FAST Start),
and their task was to remove as many hazardous service lines as
possible up to funding levels.
The primary obstacle that the FAST Start team has faced through-
out their work is uncertainty about the locations of lead or galva-
nized pipes. Although the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
requires cities to maintain an active inventory of lead service line
locations, Flint failed to do so. Service line materials are in theory
1Prior work by the authors involved estimation of water lead contamination [1].
2For further analysis of blood lead levels, see [19]
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documented during original construction or renovation, but in prac-
tice these records are often incomplete or lost. Most importantly,
because the information is buried underground, it is costly to de-
termine the material composition of even a single pipe. Digging
up an entire water service line pipe under a resident’s yard costs
thousands of dollars. City officials were uncertain about the total
number of hazardous service lines in the city, with estimates rang-
ing from a few thousand to tens of thousands. Uncertainty about
the service line material for individual homes has dramatic cost
implications, as construction crews will end up excavating pipes
that do not need to be replaced. These questions—how many pipes
need to be replaced and which home’s pipes need remediation—are
at the core of the work in this paper.
Beginning in 2016, our team began collaborating directly with
Flint city officials, analyzing the available data to provide statis-
tical and algorithmic support to guide decision making and data
collection, focusing primarily on the work of the FAST Start pipe re-
placement efforts. By assembling a rich suite of datasets, including
thousands of water samples, information on pipe materials, and city
records, we have been able to accurately estimate the locations of
homes needing service line replacement, as well as those with safe
pipes, in order to target recovery resources more effectively. Specif-
ically, we have combined statistical models with active learning
methods that sequentially seek out homes with hazardous water
infrastructure. Along the way we have developed web-based and
mobile applications for coordination among government offices,
contractors, and residents. Over time, the number of homes’ service
lines inspected and replaced has increased, as seen in Figure 1.
In the present paper, we detail the challenges faced by decision-
makers in Flint, and describe our nearly two years of work to sup-
port their efforts. With the understanding that many municipalities
across the US and the world will need to undertake similar steps, we
propose a generic framework which we call ActiveRemediation,
that lays out a data driven approach to efficiently replace hazardous
water infrastructure at large scale. We describe our implementa-
tion of ActiveRemediation in Flint, and describe the empirical
performance and potential for cost savings. To our knowledge, this
is the first attempt to predict the pipe materials house-by-house
throughout a water system using incomplete data and also the first
to propose a statistical method for adaptively selecting homes for
inspection to replace hazardous materials in the most cost effec-
tive manner. This work illustrates a holistic, data-driven approach
which can be replicated in other cities, thereby enhancing water
infrastructure renovation effort with data-driven approaches.
Key Results. Among our main results, we emphasize that our
predictive model is empirically accurate for estimating whether
a Flint home’s pipes are safe/unsafe, with an AUROC score of
nearly 0.92, and a true positive rate of 97%. Since our approach
involves a sequential protocol that manages the selection of homes
for inspection and replacement based on our statistical model, we
are also able to compare the model’s total remediation cost to that
of the existing protocol of officials. ActiveRemediation reduces
the costly error rate (fraction of unnecessary replacements) to 2%,
lowering the effective cost of each replacement by 10% and yielding
about $10M in potential savings.
Methodology. Let us now give a birds-eye view of our method-
ological template. ActiveRemediation manages the inspection
Figure 1: Progress of the replacement program. By March of 2016, only 36
homes had undergone replacement (top left); by December 2016, a total of 762
homes either been inspected or fully replaced (top right); as of September of
2017, this had grown to a total of 6,506 homes (bottom). Homes labeled green
were selected for replacement but were deemed safe after copper lines were
discovered by contractors.
and replacement of water service lines across a city, with the long-
term objective of replacing the largest number of hazardous pipes
in a city under a limited budget. The formal in-depth exposition of
this framework will be given in Section 3.
Algorithm 1 ActiveRemediation
1: Input: parcel data, available labeled homes
2: for decision period t = 1, . . . ,T : do
3: Predict hazardous/safe material via StatisticalModel
4: if Budget remaining then querying StatisticalModel,
5: Generate inspections via InspectionDecisionRule
6: Generate replacements viaReplacementDecisionRule
7: Input observed data to StatisticalModel
Since the process of identifying and replacing these lines around
a city is naturally sequential, the decisions and observations made
earlier in the process ought to guide decisions made at future stages.
With this in mind, our framework continuously maintains three
subroutines that are updated as data arrives. Following the outline
Date Description
2016 Feb. Attributes for all 55k parcels provided by the City of Flint
2016 Feb. SL records digitized by M. Kaufman at UM Flint GIS
2016 March Pilot Program, 36 homes visited, 33 SLs replaced
2016 June Michigan DEQ provides SL private-portion inspections dataset
2016 Sept. Phase One begins, contractors use our mobile data collection app
2016 Oct. Fast Start begins hydrovac inspections to verify some home SLs
2016 Oct. Congress appropriated $100M in WIIN Act.
2016 Dec. Fast Start & authors release report: 20-30k replacements needed
2017 March Federal court orders 18k homes to receive SL replacement by 2019
2017 Sept. Fast Start replaced 4,419 hazardous service lines so far, identifying
composition of a total of 6,506 homes.
Table 1: Timeline of service line data availability
in Algorithm 1, the first of these is a StatisticalModel, that gen-
erates probabilistic estimates of the material type of both the public
and private portion of each home’s service lines. The input of this
model is property data, water test results, historical records, and
observed service line materials. The second subroutine is Inspec-
tionDecisionRule, the decision procedure that that generates a
(randomized) set of homes for inspection. This should be viewed as
an active learning protocol, with the goal of “focused exploration.”
The third routine, ReplacementDecisionRule, makes decisions as
to which homes should receive line replacements; for reasons we
discuss below, we typically assume that ReplacementDecision-
Rule is a greedy algorithm.
Roadmap. This paper is structured as follows. We begin in Sec-
tion 2 by laying out the datasets available to us, with the story given
chronologically to describe the shifting narrative as information
emerged. We then explain the ActiveRemediation framework in
greater detail in Section 3, and sketch out the statistical model mixed
with the prediction, inspection, and decision-making framework. In
Section 4 we employ ActiveRemediation on the data available in
Flint, to show the empirical performance of our proposed methods
in an actual environment, as well as in a simulated environment
leveraged from Flint’s data. We finish by detailing the potential for
significant cost savings using our approach.
2 EMERGING DATA STORY OF FLINT’S PIPES
We now describe the various sources of data and the timeline during
which these became available. This is summarized in Table 1 and
more precise chronology is given throughout this section. More
details will be available in the full version of this work.
2.1 Pre-crisis Information – Through mid-2015
In this section, we explain the relevant datasets that had been
collected and maintained prior to the water crisis. This information,
as we discovered later, was limited in both depth and quality.
2.1.1 Parcel Data. The city of Flint generously provided us with
a dataset describing each of the 55,893 parcels in the city. These
data include a unique identifier for each parcel and a set of columns
describing City-recorded attributes of each home, such as the prop-
erty owner, address, value, and building characteristics. A complete
list of the parcel features is discussed in our previous work [7]. The
distributions of the age of homes and their estimated values (Figure
2) tell an important story about the kinds of properties in Flint.
Figure 2: From city parcel data, distribution of home construction by year
(left) and building value by dollar (right). The majority of the housing stock
in Flint was built when it was a major automobile manufacturing hub, before
current regulations about lead infrastructure were in place. Flint has experi-
enced significant economic decline in recent years, leading to depressed real
estate prices.
2.1.2 City Records of Service Lines. Initially, Flint struggled to
produce any record of the materials in the city’s service lines. Even-
tually, officials discovered a set of over 100,000 index cards in the
basement of the water department3 (see top of Figure 3). As part of
a pro bono collaboration, the handwritten records have been digi-
tized by Captricity.com and provided to the City of Flint.4 Around
the same time, a set of hand-annotated maps were discovered that
contained markings for each parcel that specified a record of each
home’s service line (bottom of Figure 3). The map data was digi-
tized by a group of students from the GIS Center at the University
of Michigan-Flint lead by the director Prof. Martin Kaufman [10].
Many of the entries in the city’s records list two materials for a
given record, such as “Copper/Lead,” but they do not specify the
precise meaning of the multiple labels. However, our latest evi-
dence suggests that, at least in the typical case, the double records
were intended to specify that the second label (“Lead” in “Cop-
per/Lead”) indicates the public service line material (water main
to curb stop), and the first label describes the private service line
(curb stop to home), while an entry that is simply given as “Copper”
may refer to both sections or only one. Lastly, there are a number
of entries in the records that say “Copper/?” for the service line
material, indicating missing information for the service line on the
original handwritten records. Many other records are simply blank,
recorded as “Unknown/Other.”
2.2 Peak of Crisis & Replacement Pilot
In the wake of the crisis the State of Michigan began to discuss
plans for lead abatement in Flint. It had become clear to lawmakers
in Michigan that they would need to invest in a large-scale removal
of lead pipes from the city. To begin, FAST Start initiated a pilot
phase, with the goal of replacing the service lines of a small set
of residences. Flint’s Mayor and the FAST Start team awarded a
contract to Rowe Engineering to replace pipes at 36 homes around
the city. They selected these homes based on risk factors including
the presence of high water lead levels, pregnant women, and chil-
dren younger than 6 years old. Nearly all of the homes, 33 of 36,
had some hazardous material (lead or galvanized) in one or both
3http://www.npr.org/2016/02/01/465150617/flint-begins-the-long-process-of-fixing-
its-water-problem
4We would like to thank Captricity, especially their machine learning team, Michael
Zamora,Michael Zamora, David Shewfelt, and Kayla Pak formaking the data accessible.
Figure 3: City officials located a set of over 100,000 handwritten index cards
(top) with recorded work information dating back over 100 years, and anno-
tated maps with data on home SLs (bottom). Red circles added to emphasize
markings denoting material types.
portions of the service lines, while only 3 were safe. Therefore, the
number of homes with physical verifications of both service line
portions through September 2016 was only 36 out of over 55,000
homes. A map showing the progress of replacement in Flint can be
found in Figure 1.
Verified SL Materials (Public-Private)
City Records C-C C-G L-C L-G L-L Other All
Copper 1115 10 258 84 13 9 1489
Cop./Lead 109 20 816 91 15 25 1076
Galv./Other 113 18 565 1286 81 31 2094
Lead 24 2 29 14 12 3 84
Unknown 152 18 535 1169 118 42 2034
Table 2: Discrepancies between city records of service lines, and materials
verified via inspection or replacement.
Meanwhile, in order to gather reliable information about private
part of the service lines, the Michigan Department of Environmen-
tal Quality (DEQ) directed a team of officials and volunteers from
the local plumbers union to personally inspect a sample of the
homes of Flint residents. The public portion of the service line runs
entirely under the street and sidewalk, while the private portion
runs directly into the basement of the residents’ home. Thus, the
private portion can be inspected without any digging. The DEQ
inspectors submitted their inspection results. As of June of 2016,
the department had collected a data from over 3,000 home inspec-
tions. We consider this data to be reliable, since it was curated by
DEQ officials who provided it to our team. This dataset allowed
us to partially evaluate the reliability of the city records discussed
in Section 2.1. It is important to note that the comparison is not
“apples to apples,” as the DEQ inspections were private-portion only
whereas the labels in the city records did not specify which portion
of the line was indicated. We report the confusion matrix between
DEQ inspection data and city records in Table 2. The comparison
suggests that, while the records were correlated with ground truth,
the discrepancies were substantial.
2.3 Large-Scale Replacement, Mid-2016 to Now
Our group at the University of Michigan began engaging with the
FAST Start team in the summer of 2016. One of the critical decisions
the team needed to make was the selection of homes that would
be recommended for service line replacement. According to the
FAST Start payment agreements, contractors receive roughly half
($2500) the cost of a full replacement ($5,000) for excavated homes
with copper on both public and private portions, due to removing
concrete, refilling concrete, machine use, and labor. The choice
of homes was deemed critically important, as the excavation of
a home’s service line that discovers a “safe” (e.g., copper) pipe is
effectively wasted money, aside from the benefit of learning of the
pipe’s true material. Our work has focused on minimizing such
unnecessary excavations, using the tools we describe below.
2.3.1 Early Replacement Activity and Findings (Fall 2016). By
summer 2016, FAST Start had selected a set of 200 homes for re-
placement, scheduled to begin August, 31st. This selection is called
Phase One. Like the Pilot Phase, their criteria included the presence
of high water lead levels, pregnant women, children under six years
old, as well as veterans and the elderly. In the present section, we
describe how we helped facilitate data collection for Phase One,
and how the results forced us to rethink our objectives and adjust
our models.
By late September 2016, the early data from the service line re-
placement program began to arrive, and the rate of lead and other
hazardous pipes discovered was alarming; 96% (165/171) of excava-
tions revealed lead in the public portion of the line. These findings
differed significantly from the city records, which had previously
indicated that among those homes only 40% would contain lead in
either portion. As data from Phase One arrived it was becomingly
increasingly clear that likely over 20,000 homes have unsafe pipes
serving their water – dramatically higher than earlier estimates.
Critically, as these discoveries were being made, a debate was tak-
ing place in the U.S. Congress discussing the possibility of more
than $100M in funding for the Flint’s recovery efforts.
With the debate in the Congress ongoing, our team decided to put
out an informal report to raise the alarm about the extent of the lead
issue, and several news outlets reported on our findings [e.g. 5, 8].
This effort lead to a formal report in November of 2016 that provided
a more precise estimate of the number of lead replacements likely
to be needed [18], which was provided to the city’s mayor, the
DEQ, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Our report,
based on comparing the city records and the data gathered from
contractors, suggested that the number of needed replacements
would be between 20,600 and 37,100. The large range accounts for
the inherent uncertainty in data collection and model assumptions,
as well as the question of occupancy. One challenge that is specific
to Flint is the fact that around one third of the city’s homes are not
occupied, a rate that is the highest in the country5.
2.3.2 Contractor Data Collection Application. With thousands
of homes scheduled to have their water service lines excavated by
multiple contractors, the collection and management of the data
generated by this large-scale effort would prove to be a logistical
challenge. While initially there was a plan in place to collect data
via paper forms that would later get transferred to a spreadsheet,
it was increasingly clear that digitally recording information, and
storing it centrally, would be a more effective strategy and less
prone to error.
Figure 4: Mobile and web app, developed by the authors, to gather replace-
ment data from contractors on-site.
Our team volunteered to facilitate the data collection efforts. In
the fall of 2016, we developed a web and mobile application with
various access levels. The latest version of this app is a custom-built
web application using Python and the web framework using Flask.
The users, on-site contractors as well as DEQ and Fast Start offi-
cials, are asked to select homes and to fill in essential information
about service line work accomplished at each site. This informa-
tion includes the excavated pipe materials, lengths, dates, and data
on the home’s residents. The output of the form appears in real-
time in a live database with mapping capabilities. We adopted a
tiered permissions structure with password-protected information
to maintain the privacy of the data. The app continues to be used as
of this writing for tracking progress for the public and for paying
contractors for completed work.
2.3.3 Hydrovac Digging: Inspection without Replacement. The
foremost challenge of a large-scale service line replacement pro-
gram is the uncertainty about which homes possess safe service
lines and which homes have lines made of hazardous materials. As
of the summer of 2016, the only concrete verified data on pipe mate-
rials across the city consisted of the 36 data points provided by the
Rowe engineering. By the end of Phase One, this number increased
to about 250 homes. At this point, the excavation of pipes at a single
home would cost anywhere from $2,500-5,000, a prohibitively high
5https://www.reuters.com/article/us-flint-vacancies-idUSKCN0VK08L
cost for data collection. At the same time, the available replacement
data consisted of cherry-picked homes: houses were selected for
line replacement if they were presumed to have an overwhelming
likelihood of lead. These addresses and were highly concentrated
in only three neighborhoods (see Figure 1) and provided nothing
close to a representative sample of the broader city. We therefore
realized, and emphasized to members of FAST Start, that the effort
required a cheaper, quicker, and more statistically sound method to
gather data.
Figure 5: Using a hydrovac truck for inspection, requires a large truck and
crew (left) and exposes the pipe material underground (right).
After a lengthy discussion with water infrastructure experts and
contractors, a new alternative emerged: hydrovac inspections. A
hydro-vacuum truck, or simply a hydrovac (see Figure 5), has two
main components: a high-pressure jet of water used to loosen soil
and a powerful vacuum hose that sucks the loosened material into a
holding tank. The hydrovac technique allows workers to dig a small
hole quickly and then inspect whatever is observed underground.
It is ideal for determining service line materials, as it can dig at
the location of the home’s curb box (connects the home’s service
line at the property line to the water main), and observe the pipe
materials for both the public and private portions of the service line.
The cost can be as low as $250 per inspection and often does not
require prior approval from residents, as the digging site is mostly
confined to city property. One limitation is that the hydrovac can
only dig through the soil, and not through driveway or sidewalk
pavement. This limitation led to unsuccessful excavations 20%-25%
of the time, according to the hydrovac engineers.
The selection of homes for hydrovac inspection was one of the
primary contributions of our team to FAST Start’s efforts, and we
were given wide discretion for “sampling” homes. This reflects the
political and logistical challenges of service line replacement, as
full excavation of service lines required a much longer process
with oversight by the city council. We would emphasize that, in
the following section where we describe our sequential decision
protocols, our primary focus was on the model and inspection
subroutines, and we assume the replacements are made using a
simple greedy strategy.
3 PREDICTION & DECISION FRAMEWORK
In this section, we formally define the sequential decision-making
problem for a city, in our case the city of Flint, seeking to remove
all of the lead service lines from its homes under the following
conditions: (i) for almost all homes, the service line materials of
homes are unknown; (ii) there is a method of inspection to collect
information; (iii) it is costly to excavate service lines that do not
need to be replaced; and (iv) there is a fixed budget for replacement
and inspection.
There are N total homes in the city, and it is unknown which
homes need new service lines. We let the unknown label for home i
beyi ∈ {0, 1}, taking on the value 1 if the home needs a replacement
and 0 otherwise. Note that a home needs replacement if either the
public or private portion of the service line is hazardous. We also
have information about each home, denoted by a vector xi , with
m features, that describe it (see Section 2). We want to learn the
label yi given xi , for each i = 1, . . . ,N . We divide the procedure
to find out these labels into two steps: first, a statistical model
for prediction (StatisticalModel); and second, an algorithm that
decides which homes to observe next (InspectionDecisionRule).
There is another decision rule, ReplacementDecisionRule, that
determines which pipes to replace next. ReplacementDecision-
Rule is a greedy algorithm. That is this algorithm recommends
that the replacement crew should go to the homes with the highest
probabilities of having hazardous pipes. Given that, our Inspec-
tionDecisionRule is focused on learning, and ReplacementDeci-
sionRule uses that learning to reduce costs.
3.1 StatisticalModel
In this section, we describe StatisticalModel, which assign a
probability that a service line contains hazardous materials. Statis-
ticalModel is a novel combination of predictive modeling using
machine learning and Bayesian data analysis. First, a machine learn-
ing prediction model gives a prediction for the public and private
portion of each home’s service line using known features. These
predictions then become the parameters to prior distributions in a
hierarchical Bayesian model designed to correct some of the limita-
tions to the machine learning model.
3.1.1 Machine Learning Layer. The machine learning layer of
StatisticalModel outputs a probability of having a hazardous
service line material for each home for which the material is un-
known. Specifically, this layer gives a prediction, yˆi,k = fθ (Xi,k ),
the probability that service line portion k for home i is hazardous,
and Xi,k is a vector of features, described in Section 2.1. After ex-
amining several models empirically (see Section 4.1) we chose the
machine learning layer, fθ (), to be XGBoost, a boosted ensemble of
classification trees [6].
3.1.2 Hierarchical Bayesian Spatial Model Layer. One limitation
of classification algorithms is how they handle unobserved vari-
ables, which may be correlated with the outcome. We address this
limitation with a hierarchical Bayesian spatial model. This accounts
for unobserved heterogeneity related to geographic location and
similiarity of homes, which is used in hierarchical spatial models
with conditional autoregressive structure [12, 13, 15, 16]. Empiri-
cally, each geographic region across the city (e.g., voting precincts)
has a different number of observed service lines. While a city-level
(pooled) model ignores precinct differences and a separate (un-
pooled) model for each precinct is limited by small sample sizes or
even no observations, our full hierarchical (partially pooled) model
strikes a balance with shrinkage. Precincts with little information
will have their parameters pulled towards the city-wide distribution.
Details of the Bayesian model, and how these are combined with
Table 3: Summary of notation
Notation Explanation
X observable feature space for each parcel/home
xi ,yi observable features for home i , label for home i
ht /rt indicates “home i inspected/replaced at t?”
yht /yrt indicates “learned i’s’ label via inspect./replace?”
Qit indicates “learned i’s label at t?”
qit indicates “already know i’s label at t?”
ch ,Cr+,Cr− cost of inspect., successful SLR, & failed SLR
Ut ,Lt set of labeled/unlabeled data at t
the machine learning layer, are explained further in the full version
of the paper.
3.2 InspectionDecisionRule
Now we describe InspectionDecisionRule, which utilizes active
learning [2, 3, 17] to efficiently allocate scarce resources to find and
replace hazardous service lines. In general, a decision-maker may
choose any active learning algorithm for inspection. In this work,
we implement a version of Importance Weighted Active Learning
(IWAL).
3.2.1 Active Learning Setup: Inspection and Replacement. We
begin by describing the problem of efficiently locating and replacing
hazardous pipes in a pool-based active learning framework (see
Algorithm 2). Consider a budget of B total queries and a pool P =
{x1, . . . ,xn } of unlabeled homes. Then at each time period t the
algorithm will produce a probability vector ϕt = (ϕ1,t , . . . ,ϕn,t )
that gives the probability that any home i is chosen at t .
Contractors can determine thematerial of a service line via either
hydrovac inspection or service line replacement. When home i is
chosen for hydrovac inspection at time t , we denote ht = i . When
the service line for home i is replaced at time t , we denote rt = i .
Once inspected or replaced, yi is known for all subsequent rounds
t , t + 1, . . . and pi,k becomes 1 or 0, and we define qi,t = 1 if home
i has been observed through round t . nht and nrt are the number
of hydrovac and replacement visits, respectively. The number of
successful replacements is denoted as nr+t (true positives) and the
number of unnecessary replacements as nr−t (false positives).
We initially set U0 = P, and let Ut =
{
xi |qi,t = 0
}
be the set
of homes whose service line material is unknown at time t , and
Lt be the set of homes with known service line materials. Finally,
the budget also allows for a fixed number of inspections d for each
period. The problem is how to select these d homes with unknown
labels at each period t to maximize information gained.
3.2.2 Simple Active Learning Heuristics: Uniform and Greedy. We
first propose several benchmark strategies for selecting homes for
inspection. This family of algorithms randomly alternate between
random exploration of the unobserved data and greedy inspection of
the highest-predicted hazardous homes. As we see in Table 4, these
decision rules differ in the costs they incur.
• HVI uniform (egreedy(1.0)): Select homes uniformly at ran-
dom from the pool of those with unknown service lines.
Algorithm 2 ActiveRemediation for MultiEpochReplacement
sequentially selects homes for both inspection and for replacement
each epoch, incorporating ideas from both active learning and
multi-armed bandits.
1: Input: parameters B, N , T
2: Input: initial observed data
3: for t = 1, ..., T : do
4: Update: pˆt (θ ) ← StatisticalModel pt (θ, Lt−1)
5: Inspect: ht ← InspectionDecisionRule ϕh(θ )
6: Observe labels: yht
7: Update: pˆt (θ ) ← StatisticalModel pt (θ, {Lt−1, yht })
8: Replace: rt ← ReplacementDecisionRule ϕr(θ )
9: Observe labels: yrt
10: Update:Ut ← {Ut } \ {ht , rt }, Lt ← {Lt } ∪ {ht , rt }
11: TotalCostst ← TotalCostst−1 + (ch + 1r+(cr+) + 1r−(cr−))
12: if TotalCostst ≤ B check budget then continue
13: else stop
14: HitRaterT ← nr+T /(nr+T + nr−T )
15: EffectiveCostT = TotalCostsT /nr+T
• HVI greedy (egreedy(0.0)) Select the homes most likely to
have hazardous service lines, based on current model esti-
mates.
• HVI ε-greedy (egreedy(ε)): For a 1− ε fraction of the inspec-
tions, select greedily, that is select homes for HVI based on
the highest predicted likelihood of danger. For the remaining
ε fraction, select homes uniformly at random for HVI. We
experiment with values ε = {0.1, 0.3, 0.5}. Also, we note that
HVI uniform andHVI greedy are special cases, with ε set
to 1.0 and 0.0, respectively.
3.2.3 Importance Weighted Active Learning. We propose an al-
gorithm that takes in the current beliefs about whether each home
has hazardous pipe material, and outputs a decision of which homes
should be inspected next period. This proposal is a variant of the
Importance Weighted Active Learning (IWAL) algorithm [4]. The
key idea behind IWAL is to sample unlabelled data from a biased
distribution, with more weighted placed on examples with greater
uncertainty, and then after obtaining the desired labels to incor-
porate the new date on the next iteration of model training. Our
implementation of this approach takes the part of InspectionDe-
cisionRule which is core to Algorithm 2. A full explanation of our
IWAL implementation will be available in the full version of the
paper.
3.2.4 Analyzing Costs. There are two categories of costs in-
curred in Algorithm 2: hydrovac inspections and replacement visits.
Hydrovac inspections always cost the same amount and are de-
noted ch. Service line replacement costs, however, depend on what
is actually in the ground. If contractors excavate a service line that
does not need be replaced, we still incur a cost cr− for labor and
equipment, even though no replacement occurred. On the other
hand, if contractors uncover a line that needs to be replaced then
the direct cost of replacement is cr+.
But effective cost per successful replacement is greater than its
direct cost, and we define formally it as TotalCosts/nr+, where
TotalCosts = chnh + cr+nr+ + cr−nr−
Homes visited by rule
Hydrovac Inspection Replacement Visit (Cost) Uniform None 10%
Finds Safety → not needed ($250) 230 0 23
Finds Danger → replaces Danger ($5,250) 770 0 77
None → finds Safety ($2,500) 0 230 207
None → replaces Danger ($5,000) 0 770 693
Effective Cost per Successful Replacement: $5,325 $5,747 $5,705
Table 4: Average effective cost per successful replacement varies by simple
InspectionDecisionRule, shown by 1,000 home visits.
(See Algorithm 2). In Flint, hydrovac inspection costs are sum-
marized in Table 4. We note that the effective cost of a successful
replacement is driven by two factors: the model accuracy (HitRater)
and the ratio of their costs, cr−/ch. Since unnecessary replacement
visits can be avoided by prior inspection with a hydrovac, these
two metrics, which naturally vary by city, will be critical guides to
applying this approach to other cities.
4 AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS IN FLINT
In our empirical analysis, we use the data of the confirmed ser-
vice line material from the 6,505 homes identified and replaced
by Flint FAST Start, as of September 30, 2017 collected via our
data collection app. This data is combined with our supplemen-
tary datasets describing homes (Section 2) and we train a suite of
classification models to predict the presence of hazardous service
line materials for a given home, and the predictive power of each
model is measured on hold-out sets of homes (Section 4.1). After
selecting a strong empirical model, we utilize the model predictions
in our decision-making algorithms, which recommend those homes
which will be most informative for inspection, and also those most
likely containing hazardous service line materials for replacement
(Section 4.2).
We emphasize that our methods and models were utilized by
FAST Start officials for the management of the hydrovac process,
and during the early days of the efforts we were given discretion
over which homes would receive inspections. We used this freedom
to select statistically representative samples, as well as targeted in-
spections on homes of interest. In practice, our modeling efforts had
less impact on the choice of replacement homes, as these decisions
carried greater political and logistical challenges.
4.1 Classification Algorithm Performance
Selecting a robust, precise, unbiased, and properly calibrated classifi-
cation algorithm is key for our proposed active learning framework.
Ultimately, the selected decision-making algorithm requires both ac-
curate and well-calibrated probability estimates when selecting the
next round of homes to investigate. To select such a classification
model, we employ several machine learning model and compare
them across various performance metrics. These metrics include
the Area Under Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (AUROC),
learning curves, and confusion matrices (including accuracy and
precision). Using these scores, we find that tree-based methods are
the most successful and robust category of models for this data. In
particular, the model for gradient boosted trees implemented in the
package XGBoost exhibits the strongest performance with a fewest
data points.
4.1.1 ROC and Learning Curves. The overall accuracy of the
best performing XGBoost model, based on a holdout set of 1,606
homes (25% of available data), is 91.6%, with a false-positive rate
of 3% and false-negative rate of 27%. The homes falling in the top
81% of predicted probabilities are classified as having hazardous
service lines. The ROC curves and AUROC scores show XGBoost’s
superior performance with an AUROC score of 0.939 on average
in a range of [0.925, 0.951], Figure 6 and 7). While the ROC curves
show a single run of each model, the AUROC scores are shown as
distributions of 100 bootstrapped samples obtained using a strati-
fied cross-validation strategy with 75%/25% of the data randomly
selected for training/validation. We further examine AUROC scores
using learning curves (Figure 8), using random subsets of data to
illustrate diminishing returns of additional data on model perfor-
mance using AUROC. We also introduce, temporal learning curves.
These temporal learning curves reflect the exact order of data col-
lection in 2016-17, and they show the AUROC as we re-estimate
the model every two-week period to predict the danger for all re-
maining not-yet-visited homes. We finally ensure that the model’s
predicted probabilities, which we use to quantify our prediction
uncertainty, are indeed well-calibrated probabilities. 6
Figure 6: ROC curves measuring predictions of XGBoost, RandomForest, and
lasso logistic regression on a random holdout set of all available data.
4.1.2 Risk factors. Now that we have a robust predictive model,
we can look at which features of a home and its surrounding neigh-
borhood are the most predictive feature in identifying homes with
hazardous service lines. But we are cautious to not make any causal
claims from this analysis. We obtain the feature importance values7
produced by each model by training with 20 bootstrapped samples
of the data and reported the average feature importance values.
The most informative home features relate to its age, value, and
location, suggesting that the context (place and time) in which the
home was built, as expected, is strongly correlated with service line
material. For instance, homes built during and before World War II
6While not shown here, we also considered ExtraTrees, AdaBoost (with decision tree
classifier), and Ridge Regression (regularized with L2 loss), but performance was lower
than the three presented. Full details on hyperparameter optimization will be available
in the full version.
7We calculate feature importance by weight, which is the normalized frequency with
which a feature appears in a tree amongst the ensemble.
Figure 7: Empirical distributions of AUROC scores of classifiers over several
runs on randomholdout sets. BothXGBoost andRandomForest showmarked
performance improvement over lasso logistic regression, and XGBoost gives
marginal improvement on RandomForest.
Figure 8: Temporal Learning curves for classification of hazardous service
line materials. XGBoost consistently outperforms the other classifiers, espe-
cially at the beginning of the timeline when there is less data available.
and those that are lower in value are more likely to contain lead
in their public service line. Two additional features were the city
records and the DEQ private SL inspection reports. Each was shown
to be a noisy but useful predictor, as indicated earlier in Table 2.
4.2 ActiveRemediation: Evaluation
We now discuss our implementation of the ActiveRemediation
framework applied to the particular case of Flint’s large-scale pipe
replacement program.With over $100M in investment, Flint is a per-
fect testbed to compare the performance of our proposed methods
(developed in Section 3.2) with the actual empirical performance of
the work of FAST Start thus far. Our goal is to show a high potential
for savings by minimizing the number of unnecessary replacement
visits, thus replacing more hazardous lines under the same budget.
4.2.1 Experimental testbed, and potential biases. Any experi-
mental framework needs a quality dataset, with known labels for
a large sample which we can evaluate our procedure. Fortunately
for the City of Flint, where contractors have been working for over
18 months, we have a total of 6,506 observations of service line
materials. A natural choice for an experimental environment, which
we call ActualFlint, is to use the set of observed homes in Flint
as a template for the overall city, i.e. a municipality with precisely
6,506 homes whose service line material we can query as needed.
A major challenge of relying solely on observed data is that
the actual home selection process is biased, in both the hydrovac
inspections and the line replacements. While a certain fraction
of the home selection was random, it was often reasonably arbi-
trary due to political and logistical constraints. For instance, many
of the homes selected for service line replacement were chosen
to maximize lead discovery. To assess the effect of sample bias,
we developed an experimental environment, SimulatedFlint, in
which we suppose Flint contains only those properties not in the
observed dataset. For this dataset, labels are assigned based on the
labeled hold-out data. With observed data as training, we used a
K-Nearest-Neighbors (KNN) classifier to estimate a probability for
each unknown home, and then sampled a Bernoulli random vari-
able – "safe"/"unsafe" – to assign labels. This randomized dataset
has lower potential selection bias concerns. In the reported results
below, we focus on ActualFlint, but we note that results from
SimulatedFlint were nearly equivalent.
4.2.2 Backtesting Simulation on ActualFlint. We quantify the
cost savings from implementing our algorithm by comparing the
sequential selection of homes from the proposed decision rules to
what the Flint FAST Start initiative actually did in 2016-17. The
goal is to stretch the allocated funds to remove hazardous pipes
from as many homes as possible. One source of inefficiency in
spending is unnecessary service line replacement (SLR) visits (the
false-positive error rate). Therefore, our key performance metric is
the SLR hit rate, i.e. the percentage of homes visited for replacement
that required replacement.
The proposed approach greatly improves the hit rate. Our key
finding from the simulation shows that we predict a reduced rate of
costly unnecessary replacements visits from 18.8% (actual) to 2.0%
(proposed). Figure 9 illustrates the direct comparison of hit rates
for our proposed approach, IWAL(0.7), based on our ActualFlint
simulation, compared to Flint FAST Start.
Second, the cost savings are substantial. The proposed algorithm,
with a higher hit rate, increases the number of homes that receive
service line replacements for the same number of visits. This, in turn,
reduces the effective cost of a successful service line replacement.
The effective cost includes both the direct costs of successful re-
placement visit and the average costs incurred by exploring homes
from hydrovac inspections or unnecessary replacement visits. Hav-
ing access to the exact same set of 6,505 homes actually observed,
we find that the algorithm on average saves an additional 10.7%
in funds per successful replacement (see Table 5). Across 18,000
total planned service line replacements, this would extend to an
expected savings of about $11M out of current spending. In terms
of the overall removal of lead pipes, this is approximately equiva-
lent to 2,100 additional homes in the city that would receive safe
water lines. These estimates are made using the current costs in
Flint, where hydrovac inspection costs ch = $250, unnecessary
replacement costs cr− = $2, 500, and successful replacement costs
cr+ = $5, 000.
Actual Proposed Algorithm .
Mean Range
For every 1 successful replacement:
Effective cost $5,818 $5,196 ($5,186 to $5,208)
Predicted savings ($) – $621.7 ($610.4 to $632.4)
Predicted savings (%) – 10.7% (10.5% to 10.9%)
For every 1,000 successful replacements, the savings generate:
Extra inspections – 94 (92 to 96)
Extra replacements – 120 (117 to 122)
For 18,000 successful replacement:
Predicted savings ($ in millions) – $11.18m ($10.99m to $11.39m)
Table 5: Cost savings. The proposed method lowers the effective cost per suc-
cessful service line replacement, saving $621.7 per home (10.7%), enough to
remove lead from an additional 2,000 homes on the same budget.
Figure 9: Tracking hit rates over time, the proposed IWAL algorithm (blue;
mean = 98.0%) outperform actual (green; mean = 81.2%; thick line is smoothed
plot)
The proposed approach outperforms a competitive set of natu-
ral benchmark strategies. Instead of only comparing our proposed
method to what actually occurred, we also consider a range of alter-
native methods. In particular, greedy (egreedy with 0% exploration)
inspects the highest rate of hazardous homes inspected (HVI hitrate
91%), and uniform (egreedy with 100% exploration) inspects the low-
est (63%). But IWAL does better with a more principled approach,
selecting homes that are likely to be most informative, with risk
probabilities near 70%. Figure 10 shows how IWAL and two greedy
heuristics differ. Higher HVI hit rate is not better; instead, it is the
choice of which homes to explore with inspection that matters. The
uncertainty in performace of each algorithm comes from sampling
variation from running 25 independent simulated experiments. We
prefer IWAL to alternatives because it has greater savings and is
less sensitive to tuning parameters.
We acknowledge some assumptions in our simulations. First, we
only consider the cost of each job and not the time required for
crews to move between homes, where there may be logistical issues
with redirecting teams around the city. Second, in this analysis
we have treated the ActualFlint as having only 6,506 homes of
which all are visited. This creates an arbitrary finite end point, as
the algorithm runs out of homes with unsafe service lines. To avoid
this effect, the above calculations, figures, and tables are based on
the first 4,500 replacement visits and 2,250 hydrovac inspections.
Of course, to validate this, we would need access to a larger set,
and thus we turn to our larger simulation using a full size of Flint.
Finally, the results are robust to resource allocation schedule and
batch size. We recognize that we used a schedule of SLR and HVI
Figure 10: HVI Hit Rates. egreedy(0) tends to over-inspect whereas egreedy(1)
is too conservative. IWAL more effectively optimizes HVI hit rate.
activities different than Flint FAST Start. To disentangle the con-
found between our choice of algorithms and the schedule, we ran
an additional version of the ActualFlint backtest, with the sched-
ule as closely aligned with Flint FAST Start in 2016-17 as possible.
Across alternative scenarios tested the results differed only slightly.
4.2.3 Results from SimulatedFlint. In our second simulation,
we demonstrate the potential value of deploying the algorithm at
scale and characterize the long-term performance of the algorithms.
Via SimulatedFlint we find that the proposed algorithms, with
the aim of replacing hazardous lines from 18,000 homes out of a
simulated city of 48,000 homes, can achieve 11.8% savings relative
to the current rate of spending. The best algorithm using IWAL
yields an average effective cost of $5,133 per successful replacement,
better than $5,818 observed in Flint (Table 5). As a final note, the
proposed algorithms’ SLR hit rates are all above 98.0%.
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